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In an increasingly global India, an agricultural community in Pune, Maharashtra was
faced with losing farmland to urbanization and devised an unusual solution. Pooling
their land together, these farmers leveraged their social and political networks to take
advantage of the changing economic climate in Pune and built a mixed-use township on
their 400 acres of farmland. They formed alliances with other stakeholders, both
internally within the agricultural community and externally at the city and state levels.
This case study highlights the significance of ad-hoc coalitions in the power and politics
of urban processes in an Indian city. These coalitions have emerged as a result of a
political power and leadership vacuum in Indian cities in the face of the changing focus
and priorities of national and regional governments as well as a growing gap in urban
service provision.
Introduction
Few studies examining urban planning in India place issues of power squarely at the
center of their arguments or focus on the role of specific actors in urban processes and the
strategies that these actors employ. Moreover, research that does look at issues of power
remains normative and does not focus on an understanding of the ‘Realpolitik and real
rationality that characterizes studies of power’ (Flyvberg, 2002: 353). In particular, the
study of Indian politics has been focused on examining the role of the nation-state
(Kohli, 1986; Gupta, 1989; Kohli, 2004). While there have been studies on different
aspects of urban India (Khilnani, 1999; Srinivas, 2001; Baviskar, 2003; Roy, 2003;
Chatterjee, 2004; Heitzman, 2004; Nair, 2005), it is only recently that researchers have
begun to take a look at contemporary actors involved in urban processes and the politics
of these processes (Hansen, 2001; Roy, 2003; Benjamin, 2008; Weinstein, 2008). A
particular area of interest has been the relationship between the government (at national,
regional and local levels) and actors outside government, highlighting the role that
informal networks play in urban development and governance processes. This study adds
to that work by exploring how politics, social networks and the relationships between
state and non-state actors influence and impact real estate development.
In the last two decades, urban India has undergone a transformation. A change in the
focus and priorities of national and regional governments reflected especially in the
gradual withdrawal of active government involvement in urban development, lack of
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political and administrative leadership and a growing gap in urban service provision have
created a political power vacuum in Indian cities. The liberalization of the economy has
also opened up avenues of interaction and participation that were earlier inaccessible.1
This has created the perfect situation for opportunistic urban stakeholders such as
business leaders, politicians, bureaucrats, landowners, farmers and NGO leaders, from
both ‘corporate’ and ‘local’ economies (Benjamin, 2000) to create ‘participatory spaces’
(Sridharan, 2008: 293) in which to act.2 Taking advantage of this political vacuum, urban
stakeholders use their social and political networks to form ad-hoc coalitions that are
often temporary, short-term in nature, with a particular goal in mind. Focusing on power
and politics in urban processes, this article examines actors involved in mega-project
development and the coalitions they formed in the city of Pune in the Indian state of
Maharashtra.
Faced with losing their land and livelihood to urbanization, an agricultural community
on the eastern edge of Pune leveraged their social and political networks and pooled their
land together to convert 400 acres of farmland into an integrated, mixed-use township
called Magarpatta City. Using this case as a lens, I examine the politics of urban
development in Pune. I focus on how longstanding power structures and political
networks are adapting to a changing political and economic urban environment. My main
research question asks what role power structures and political networks play in urban
development processes in India. Moreover, in the context of the commodification of land
and the heating up of Indian real estate markets, how do these dynamics of power
change?
Focusing on Pune, I find that the program of economic reform that began in the 1990s
has provided actors who were earlier not directly involved in urban development with the
opportunity to capitalize on assets like control over land and access to social and political
connections. This has been enabled in part by state government incentives for new and
emerging industries like information technology and biotechnology focusing explicitly
on land development (Government of Maharashtra, 2007). I also show how these actors
built coalitions and acted outside the ‘formal’ legal and institutional frameworks to
successfully complete their development projects. While a wider variety of urban actors
are now able to participate in urban development, my research found that, in the case of
Pune, these actors are usually well connected socially and politically, and use these
connections as a starting point for building coalitions.
Theorizing urban politics in India
Rapid growth in the Indian urban population (United Nations Population Fund, 2007) has
been accompanied by demands for improved infrastructure, better governance and a
growing need for land and real estate development. As a result, the Indian government
1 For example, economic reforms have made a wide variety of financial products such as personal
home loans, small business loans and financing for real estate development more easily available,
giving a boost to local real estate development. In addition, economic liberalization has encouraged
the growth and development of new industries like information technology and biotechnology. This
in turn has created a growing demand for new kinds of office space, as well as more housing and
related development, which has also fueled real estate markets in Indian cities.
2 Benjamin (2000) defines ‘local economies’ as those that develop largely outside the master plan
area, are often informal in nature and provide the majority of the urban (poor) population with
employment and accommodation. ‘Corporate economies’, on the other hand, are the strongholds
of the wealthier urban residents, including those working in newer industries like information
technology. Benjamin specifically differentiates between local and corporate economies on the basis
of their interactions with government: local economies interact with government through local-level
officials while corporate economies usually have connections with higher-level government officials
and politicians.
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has begun to encourage large-scale involvement of the private sector, domestic and
international, in various aspects of urban development. Private sector participation has
increased significantly in areas that were formerly under the purview of governmental
agencies including infrastructure development and housing, particularly since 2005
when the Indian government started allowing foreign direct investment in real estate. The
building of these development projects in the Indian context is accompanied both in
physical design and rhetoric, by the aspiration to become ‘global’ or ‘world-class’,
echoing the sentiments of city and state governments (Times News Network, 2006; PTI,
2009; The Hindu, 2010). This desire to achieve ‘global city’ status is also evident in
emerging urban policy; prompting the creation of advisory bodies like urban taskforces
(for example, the Bangalore Agenda Task Force set up by the Karnataka state
government in the late 1990s, or the ‘Bombay First’ group that emerged as a
recommendation of the Maharashtra government-commissioned McKinsey and
Company’s ‘Vision Mumbai’ report) and governments undertaking reforms to help
Indian cities become ‘global’. This section explores the Indian urban context and
possible ways of theorizing Indian urban politics given the diverse array of stakeholders
involved in processes of urban development.
The last two decades have seen the empowerment of several actors (for example, real
estate developers, local entrepreneurial politicians, designers and planning consultants,
civil society organizations), and the emergence of others who were almost entirely absent
previously (like international architects and global financial companies) (Dupont, 2007;
Jha and Sinha, 2007; Sharma and Thomson, 2010). While mutually beneficial political
alliances are not unusual or indeed novel in Indian cities, the coalitions discussed here are
different because several of their members would not have had the power or influence
over urban development and policy issues prior to economic liberalization that they do
now. Urban alliances or coalitions of the type examined in this study have their roots in
personal social networks and are formed around the ability of various stakeholders to
mobilize specific resources and use their personal relations as bargaining tools. These
coalitions include a variety of stakeholders ranging from government bureaucrats and
politicians to corporate leaders, urban planners and civil society organizations. As
compared to the established governmental and quasi-governmental institutions that are
currently charged with planning and governing Indian cities, alliances of this sort are
infinitely adaptable in terms of the number and type of participants, how long the
alliances exist and their purpose.
The coalitions are also flexible in the form they take — while some engage with
specific issues relating to land and its development, others have a larger agenda of urban
reform of which land-related issues are only one part. These urban coalitions have no
institutional home and lie between the formal and the informal, the legal and the illegal.
They are becoming more effective at achieving their goals than several government-
initiated and executed urban development and governance efforts. However, this increase
in efficiency is often accompanied by a trade-off in equity. Since these coalitions tend to
have a narrow focus, aiming only to successfully achieve their goals, they do not address
the needs of a broader urban population in the same way a government would. In order
to understand contemporary urban development in India, it is necessary to understand
how these urban coalitions emerge, endure, and often, succeed.
Most work on Indian politics either examines the working of the ‘state’ at a high level
(Kohli, 1987; 1990; Kundu, 2003; Aijaz, 2008) or emphasizes grassroots mobilization
and people’s movements (Benjamin, 2000; Baviskar, 2003; Shaw, 2007). Other
approaches have examined Indian politics from a subaltern perspective (most
prominently, the work of Partha Chatterjee). However, these studies have left
unexplained the details of how city government and the politics of development interact
with and take advantage of higher-level changes that are key to understanding
contemporary urbanization in India and beyond. This study takes a step in that direction
by examining how specific actors in Indian cities mobilize to take advantage of current
economic and political conditions to attain particular goals. While these questions have
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been undertheorized in Indian urban studies, other scholars working in a variety of other
contexts have extensively discussed similar issues, particularly in applications of regime
theory and the growth machine thesis (Stone, 1989; Kirby and Abu-Rass, 1999;
Fainstein, 2001; Zhang, 2002; Wood, 2004; Dahl, 2005; Kulcsar and Domokos, 2005;
Strom, 2007; Yang and Chang, 2007; Shatkin, 2008). Although regime theory has not
been used explicitly in published work in the Indian context, there have been some
studies in recent years that examine the dynamics of contemporary urban politics in
India, focusing on specific political actors in Indian cities (for example, see Kamath,
2006; Weinstein, 2008; 2009; Ghertner, 2011). Frameworks used by the growth machine
thesis and regime theory can therefore provide a useful, though somewhat unusual,
starting point for understanding these changes in India.
Both regime theory and the growth machine thesis raise questions about urban
development and governance that are very relevant to contemporary Indian urbanization.
The growth machine thesis (Logan, 1976; Molotch, 1976; Logan and Molotch, 1987)
focuses on urban land, its control, development and transfer, and on those actors
concerned intimately with land. Drawing on studies of urbanization in the US, the growth
machine thesis argues for a ‘politics of place’, raising questions not only about ‘who
governs’ but also ‘for what’. It claims that local politics revolves around land and its
development; and that this politics is dominated by a pro-growth coalition of key urban
actors, which ultimately shapes urban future through its transformation of local policy
(Logan et al., 1999). Urban regime theory takes a broader approach, addressing issues of
social power and the role that coalitions between interested parties play in the
development and governing of cities, of which land is but one issue (Stone, 1989;
Fainstein, 1995; Lauria, 1999). Regime theorists are interested in the question of who
makes up the governing coalition, how they came together and with what consequences
(Stone, 1989). It focuses largely on the relationship between those that wield economic
power (usually large corporations) and those in government. Regime theory also situates
cities within a larger global framework, acknowledging the impact that processes of
globalization and worldwide economic restructuring have on the social order within
cities (Fainstein, 1995). I explore the idea of coalitions and the notion of social power
borrowed from the growth machine thesis and urban regime theory and their applicability
in the Indian context. While these ideas provide a useful starting point to examine power
structures and the role that stakeholders play in Indian cities, the conclusions that emerge
from the Indian urban experience are distinct.
Growth coalitions as discussed in these theories are usually a result of a partnership
between powerful local economic actors, represented by city businesses, and
governmental authority in the form of an elected mayor. Both growth machine and
regime theory assume considerable local agency on the part of the mayor as well as local
businesses in mobilizing regimes around a specific shared development agenda.
However, the case in India is somewhat different: although cities do have mayors, they
are often toothless and lack the power to actually mobilize coalitions. City governments
are also not as powerful in India, with state-level governmental actors like the Chief
Minister, the state cabinet and various parastatal agencies exercising considerable power
over urban development. Lacking formal political power and responsibility, local actors
tap informal networks, leveraging their personal relationships with influential state-level
actors. The coalitions that exist in Indian cities build on personal social networks, making
individual relationships much more important. Coalition members in India are typically
urban actors who share longstanding informal social relationships with each other. As
opportunities arise, urban actors build on these informal relationships to create urban
coalitions with specific goals in mind. These goals could vary from successfully
accomplishing a real estate development project to changing the urban governance policy
in the city.
Also, unlike in theories that argue for a single governing coalition or a growth
machine, in Indian cities there may be multiple coalitions functioning at any particular
point. In part, this is the outcome of a pluralist politics in India. Moreover, power in urban
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India is fragmented: there is no single interest group that controls enough resources
(financial, political or governmental) to be the driving force in a single coalition. The
nature of urban political power in India, therefore, almost requires numerous coalitions
that reflect the various power groups in the city. There are several interest groups in
Indian cities that wield significant influence and power, and this is reflected in the
multiplicity of coalitions.
To begin to develop a theory of power in Indian urban politics, this study examines the
role that coalitions play in urban development, how urban coalitions in India mobilize
and function, what gives their members access to power and how government is
responding to these changes. I find that urban coalitions in India are emerging as a
response to an urban power vacuum that is prompting such coalition formation and
opportunistic behavior on the part of various stakeholders, both within and outside
government. Reflecting a change in the roles of both public and private sectors in India,
these coalitions are formed by groups of individuals who have access to a set of key
resources that include, but are not limited to, a strong set of (mostly informal, personal)
social and political connections and financial capital. To illustrate, the farmers in this
study were able to leverage their social and political networks in order to successfully
take advantage of emerging development opportunities in Pune. The catalyst that
converts a social network into a coalition is the ability of one or two key individuals —
like the leader of this particular farmer community in Pune, Satish Magar — to recognize
or sometimes create an opportunity out of emerging circumstances and consequently
bring together in a coalition other key persons who bring specific resources to the group.
These individuals need not be central controlling figures of authority like a mayor or a
prominent corporate leader. Although socially and politically well connected, Magar is
not politically active himself and neither was he among the leading entrepreneurs in Pune
until he successfully developed Magarpatta City. His success lies in the fact that he was
able to leverage his personal connections to form several small alliances or coalitions that
allowed him and his community to successfully develop their land.
I conducted the research for this article in 2008–09 in India.3 Primary data were
collected through a series of semi-structured personal interviews: I used a set of
questions to guide the interview process but respondents were free to direct the
conversation towards their respective areas of expertise and knowledge. Drawing on
Fainstein’s methodology in The City Builders (2001), I used a reputational method to
identify respondents, relying on them to point me to others who would be potentially
valuable informants. In all, about 20 interviews were conducted. The length of the
interviews ranged from 30 minutes to 2 hours. A few of the respondents were interviewed
more than once. Several respondents requested anonymity and are therefore not
identified directly in the text below. Those interviewed included the developers of
Magarpatta City as well as key employees and associates of the development company,
lawyers, bankers, architects, real estate developers, former and present government
officials, academics, journalists and knowledgeable observers in Pune and Mumbai.
Secondary data were collected from government reports, reports from consulting firms
and newspaper archives.
Building Magarpatta City
Pune is the second largest city after Mumbai in the state of Maharashtra, with a
population of around 5 million, located 163 kilometers or approximately 100 miles east
3 Some of the data were collected prior to the economic crisis and may not reflect recent changes. In
general, however, Indian cities (especially the smaller ones) have witnessed a slowdown in the rates
of urban development and returns that investors are earning on investments in real estate. There
has also been a sharp reduction in international funds investing in urban development projects in
Indian cities.
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of Mumbai. Pune has been a stronghold for manufacturing and is also a thriving center
for higher education (Shaw, 1999). In the last couple of decades, the city has seen rapid
urbanization that coincided with its emergence as a regional and national hub for
information technology and biotechnology, while maintaining its strong connections to
agriculture. However, despite the growing presence of multinational companies in the
city, the majority of the businesses in Pune are still controlled by locals, most of the
development that takes place is locally driven and funded, and connections between
people, whether social or commercial, remain intensely personal. Another unusual
aspect, at least with respect to urban development, that came to light during my
interviews in Pune is the relative absence of the non-resident Indian or NRI. Several
Indian cities, most notably Bangalore and Hyderabad have entire neighborhoods catering
to NRIs who also play a large part in funding development in India. This is not yet the
case in Pune where international involvement in urban development has been minimal.
Pune’s rapid growth has been partly fueled by government incentives, especially for
emerging sectors like information technology, biotechnology and related industries. The
state government has created an incentive package for these sectors, offering them
‘geobribes’ (Roy, 2009) in the form of cheap land and tax incentives (such as waiver of
stamp duties, interest and tax holidays and reduction of other fees like electricity and
water payments) in return for locating in Pune (Government of Maharashtra, 2007).
Pune’s growth has also led to an increased demand for housing and office space that
quickly outstripped what was available in the city. Officially, the Pune Municipal
Corporation (PMC) is responsible for the urban planning and development of the city
together with the state town-planning directorate. However, the PMC tends to take a
more reactive approach to planning, acting more as a regulator than actively planning for
city growth and development, focusing more on regulation of development and
infrastructure development in the city on a case-by-case basis. In addition, most of the
decision making and power in India is concentrated at higher levels in the governmental
structure — in this case, in the hands of the state government. This has resulted in the
ineffectual management of the city, partly because of a weak city government and
continual state-level interference. Pune has thus grown incrementally with the need for
housing and other services being organically met by local developers and residents.
Pune’s farmers have been key players in the city’s real estate development industry.
They are also an extremely powerful community, financially and politically, as a
consequence of their involvement in the sugar cooperatives.4 In addition to fostering a
culture of cooperation and collaboration, the sugar cooperatives were also extremely
influential politically (Chithelen, 1980/1981; Lalvani, 2008). Farmers in Pune are
therefore no strangers to politics. While land acquisition and development is highly
politicized in Pune, as in most Indian cities, what is unusual is the role that farmers play
in the development process. They own a significant amount of land in and around Pune.
They are also highly involved in politics at the local level. As a result, in Pune, the
farmers, local politicians and the real estate lobby overlap to a large extent.
Located on the eastern periphery of Pune, Magarpatta City stands on 400 acres of
erstwhile farmland that has been owned by the Magar farming community for over 300
years.5 The part of Pune that is home to Magarpatta City also houses a large industrial
estate as well as several Information Technology (IT), Information Technology Enabled
Services (ITES) and biotechnology companies. Consequently there was and continues to
4 A very successful cooperative movement, which began around the 1950s, controls sugarcane
farming and the manufacture of sugar in Maharashtra. It was also very closely connected to local,
regional and state-level politics. At one time, the leaders of the sugar cooperatives influenced the
state government very strongly. This led to serious issues of corruption and power grabbing. While
the cooperatives are still in operation, their hold over state politics is somewhat diminished. For
more, see Chithelen (1985) and Lalvani (2008).
5 ‘Magar’ is the name of the clan that owns most of the land in the area, while ‘patta’ means land strip.
The name ‘Magarpatta’ therefore means ‘the strip of land owned by the Magars’.
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be a great demand for housing space as well as commercial and retail establishments in
the area. The farmers in the region were worried by the prospect of losing both their
homes and livelihood if the area were to be developed as part of the city. Small farmers
in the area had already begun to sell off their land. The Magar community knew that it
would only be a matter of time before developers began to approach them to buy their
property. Collectively, the community owned more than 400 acres of land. Taking
advantage of the existing demand in the area, the farmers decided to pool their land and
develop it themselves instead of selling it to another developer.
Magarpatta City owes its success largely to three key factors: the favorable
economic climate in Pune at the time, the entrepreneurial nature of the Magar
community, and of course, the coalitions that one of the farmers — Satish Magar —
was able to mobilize, by leveraging his social networks. Satish Magar is not an
ordinary farmer. He comes from a very influential local family that is extremely well
connected socially and politically. His grandfather was mayor of Pune. His uncle was
a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) in the Maharashtra state government
and also later a Member of Parliament and highly influential, especially in state
politics (Dalal, 2008). As politicians, both his grandfather and uncle had very close ties
with the Congress Party, which happened to be in power in the state government in the
1990s, when Magarpatta City was being conceived. His father was an engineer and ran
his own civil construction firm. Satish Magar was therefore familiar with both politics
and project development. Moreover, he and his family were the largest landholders in
the Magar community. Of the 400 acres that collectively belonged to the Magar
farming community, Satish Magar and his family owned about 150 acres. All of this
added to the influence that he had on the decision-making process within the farmer
community.
Satish Magar and his social and political connections proved to be invaluable in the
development of Magarpatta City. He leveraged his influence and kinship ties with the
farmer community to encourage them to participate in the project. He also tapped into his
vast personal social network to request advice and assistance from experts in a variety of
fields as consultants to the project. Essentially two broad coalitions were formed, with
Magar at the center of each. The first was an alliance that he formed with the farmer
families in order to create the parcel of land on which the development was to take place.
The second was actually a series of smaller alliances with specific individuals that came
together as the board of directors of the company and in the form of various consultants
to the project consisting of experts from different fields including IT, education, finance,
and planning and design.
As a result of national economic liberalization policies started in the early 1990s,
several multinational companies were looking for a foothold in the Indian market. They
found Pune with its proximity to Mumbai and ready pool of highly skilled labor an
attractive location. Demand for residential and office space soared, and the city
government that planned for urban infrastructure and development in Pune was unable to
keep up, providing the perfect opportunity to the private sector to fill the void. While
several local developers jumped into the fray, Magarpatta City was one of the first
projects to begin offering both office and residential space within the same walls. There
continues to be a spate of large project development in and around Pune (Bari and
Savitha, 2010; Chandrashekhar, 2010), most of which has been built by various
coalitions between mostly local (Pune-based) real estate developers and city and state-
level politicians. What is unusual about Magarpatta City is that it was a very ambitious
project born out of an alliance between the landowners, without any real estate
developers being involved. More than most economic sectors in India, the real estate
development sector depends hugely on personal connections, especially in government.
Some of these are built up over several years by developers and architects. It is extremely
difficult for newer players to enter the field.
The Magarpatta Township Development and Construction Company (MTDCC) was
formed as a private limited company to oversee development and management of the
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project. Before forming the company, a variety of models were considered, including a
cooperative approach.6 Prakash Deshmukh, the architect of Magarpatta City, explained
to me that the driving idea behind the formation of a private limited company was to put
a structure in place that functioned efficiently but was also democratic, thereby giving the
landowners a say in the running of the business. He added that the formation of the
company was made easier by the fact that all the farmers owned and farmed their own
land. Each family got shares proportional to its landholding and was made an equity
shareholder.7 The shares of the company may be held and traded among member families
only, not publicly traded. The company is run by the managing director and the technical
director in consultation with the board of directors, eight of whom come from the
landholding families (Ganguli, 2008).
Drawing on a personal acquaintance, Satish Magar approached a prominent architect
and designer from Mumbai, Hafeez Contractor, with a proposal to produce the initial
master plan for the township. With the preliminary plan ready, Magar approached Sharad
Pawar, the then Chief Minister of the state with whom he had close personal ties, for
assistance in getting governmental permissions.8 This was a particularly challenging
undertaking since permission for urban development on agricultural land in India is
notoriously difficult to obtain. The recently retired Cabinet Secretary for the state of
Maharashtra, Mr B.G. Deshmukh, another acquaintance, was one of the consultants on
the project. He introduced Magar to the Secretary for Urban Planning in Maharashtra at
that time, Mr D.T. Joseph, who took a personal interest in the project. These connections
were vital to obtaining project approval and building permissions from the government.
Magarpatta City was one of the first projects of its kind to be proposed in the state of
Maharashtra. There were several legal and regulatory constraints in place at the time that
would have made the construction of such a project challenging, such as the Urban Land
Ceiling Regulation Act that had been put in place to prevent a few individuals or entities
from controlling large plots of land.9 Navigating government bureaucracy and obtaining
the requisite permissions would have been close to impossible for a group of farmers
without these political connections.
Another major obstacle to the development of Magarpatta City was the lack of
financing. As farmers, the Magars did not have significant capital to invest in the
development of the project. However, they did have one big advantage: since they, as
landowners, were themselves developing the land, they did not have any land acquisition
costs nor any displacement or resettlement issues. Given the regulatory structure for
lending to real estate companies in India at that time, it was difficult to get bank loans for
development projects.10 In addition, bankers and financiers did not consider the project
to be feasible — a group of farmers with no prior knowledge or experience in real estate
development did not inspire confidence in lenders. Satish Magar was well acquainted
with the retired Deputy General Manager (DGM) of one of the leading development
6 Deshmukh emphasized that the cooperative approach was rejected partly based on the experiences
of the sugar cooperative movement in Maharashtra, but also because landholding sizes within the
community varied immensely. A cooperative structure would have stressed equality rather than
equity and might have dampened some of the enthusiasm and initiative that the families had. In
addition, since landholding sizes ranged from one acre to 150 acres, giving equal importance to all
landholders would have taken away the incentive the farmers had for pooling their land. See also
Ganguli (2008).
7 Each share is equal to one square meter of land.
8 Pawar was then a very high-ranking leader in the Congress Party. He now heads his own political
party: the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP). He comes from a small village near Pune and is
extremely influential in the region. He has a very close relationship with the sugar cooperatives and
the farmers in the area. His daughter and nephew continue to be prominent in regional politics in
Pune. Magar’s family knew him as a result of their political background.
9 Magarpatta City’s proposal to pool land together would have been in violation of this act. The act has
since been abolished.
10 Loans in India are typically granted for construction costs rather than land acquisition.
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finance institutions in India — the Housing Development Finance Corporation (HDFC).
On the DGM’s advice, Magar approached the managing director of HDFC, Deepak
Parekh, and managed to obtain an initial loan of Rs 2 crore (approximately US
$420,00011) to help them start construction (Dalal, 2008).12 Moreover, Deepak Parekh
shared a personal rapport with Magar and provided valuable guidance on the actual
construction and marketing process (ibid.). HDFC also entered into a preferential lender
agreement with MTDCC whereby it offered lower rates of interest for retail home loans
to those interested in buying property in Magarpatta City.
The actual planning and design process was essentially managed and controlled by the
board of directors. The company promoted entrepreneurship among the farmers and
encouraged it by providing special training to develop particular skill sets. The time it
took to get the necessary clearances from the government was used for capacity building.
At least one working member from each of the 120 families was trained so that he would
be able to assist with the actual construction of the project. Some farmers were sent to
various construction sites across India to study how other projects were being executed,
while others were sent to learn construction management or other specific skills at local
technical institutes. As a result, the company had its own team trained by the time it was
ready to start construction. This had a dual purpose: not only did it cut down on the cost
of construction since the work was being done in-house; it also helped erstwhile farmers
to gradually transition into alternative occupations, ensuring that they were not
unemployed when their land was put to non-agricultural uses.
The farmers themselves did most of the actual work from laying bricks and shifting
soil with their farming equipment to managing the construction project. The first phase
of construction involved the simultaneous building of villas, a few apartment blocks,
some commercial space, plus part of the IT Park. The development targeted IT firms and
their potential employees. The money that was generated by selling or leasing these
developments funded further construction. Also, the company assured itself a constant
revenue stream by not selling any of the commercial space in the IT Park but only leasing
it. It also retained control over the maintenance of the entire project. The construction
process began in 2000: the first residential buildings and the school were ready by 2003
and the first phase of office space followed in 2004. As of 2008, Magarpatta City is about
80% complete. A total of 7,500 apartments are planned, of which about 90% have already
been sold. The total residential population, once development is complete, is anticipated
to be around 100,000 people. The current residential population is 50,000 people and the
working population is 6,500. Most of the people living in Magarpatta City (apart from
the farmer families) are newer migrants to Pune who moved there to work in the IT or
related industries. A large number of people living in Magarpatta City also work at
companies located in the IT Park.
Post-development, most of the farmer families continue to stay on site and own either
apartments or villas that they have bought with the money they made through the
company. Moreover, some of them have succeeded in renting out some of their property,
creating yet another source of income. The land also continues to be registered in their
name, maintaining ownership and giving them a sense of security. Farmer families have
also managed to move beyond agriculture and into other occupations. Several spin-off
subsidiary businesses have emerged such as local companies providing cable TV and
broadband internet, catering and food supply, laundry, landscaping and a local transport
system. About 70% of the families are now under tax audits, earning a minimum of Rs
40 lakh (approximately US $85,000) a year and paying a total of about Rs 10–12 crores
in taxes as a community (Dalal, 2008).
11 US $1 is approximately equal to Rs 48 at the present exchange rate.
12 Once the government approves plans, the financial institution loans money on a phase-by-phase
basis, requiring the simultaneous development of a revenue stream and the completion of one phase
of construction prior to loaning more money.
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Magarpatta City owes its success to the Magars’ ability to leverage their social
networks and kinship ties to first build an informal working coalition and convert that
into a more formal arrangement in the form of the development company. It has been
heralded as a huge success by the media and the government (Financial Express Bureau,
2004; Arun, 2006; Ganguli, 2008; Shah, 2009; Nair and Ahluwalia, 2010) — in part, this
is due to sheer disbelief that something of this scale could be accomplished by a group
of farmers. However, as with any large undertaking, it was not without its opponents,
from both within the farming community and outside.13 Initially, the farmers were
unwilling to pool their land because of the risks associated with the project and there
were a few families that resisted and decided to go their own way. Local environmental
groups and activists are not happy with the development either. They complain that
Magarpatta City has begun a trend of using agricultural land in Pune to build large
projects, raising food security threats. They also point to other areas around the city that
were zoned for development in the proposed master plan but have not yet been
developed. However, the opposition has not affected Magarpatta City much. The
development is a success and the Magars are planning their next project, to be built a
little outside Pune, along the same lines.
Coalitions and urban development
Power in Indian cities is fragmented. Unlike in the US, where a handful of powerful
individuals control city development (Stone, 1989) (like Atlanta’s mayors or the ‘Vault’
in Boston), no single group in Indian cities has enough power to control development
or governance policy, leading to a need for collaboration and cooperation. City
governments lack the power or the authority needed for taking decisions. Urban
governance and development functions are spread across different government agencies.
Power in Indian cities is distributed across different groups — ranging from the ‘petty
bourgeoisie’, including rich farmers, merchants and small property owners, across the
‘new middle class’, comprising those with advanced professional degrees and cultural
capital occupying important positions in various institutions, to salaried workers in
public and private sector enterprises (Fernandes and Heller, 2006). Each of these groups
has access to a specific set of resources (such as financial capital, property, educational
or technical expertise and governmental authority) that makes them valuable to the urban
coalitions that are emerging to fill the gap created by the absence of a central font of
power. Although a single group does not have the power or resources to influence change,
different factions mobilize their resources through shared social and political networks
that are leveraged to form urban coalitions, enabling them to share access to resources
and achieve specific developmental and policy goals. What is important in the Indian
example is the role that individual networks play. Interest groups are able to build on their
personal networks to form specific goal-related coalitions. While regime theory
frameworks are very useful in pointing us towards these issues by asking questions about
the basis of power, forms of mobilization and power structures, they do not take us much
further. Power structures in Pune are based on social relations: kinship networks, caste
and community relations and personal friendships.
The coalitions in this case used these networks to effectively accomplish the
development of Magarpatta City. Conditions created by the globalizing of the Indian
13 During fieldwork, it was very difficult to find anyone who would talk openly about any form of
opposition to Magarpatta City. Despite several attempts, I was unable to talk to the farmer families
that decided not to participate in the project. Extensive searches of newspaper archives also yielded
little by way of critiques of the development. Despite there being clear evidence of opposition to the
project, it has not been vocalized very prominently. Most respondents during interviews downplayed
their concerns and requested that they remained anonymous, citing Sharad Pawar’s involvement
with the project as the reason.
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economy presented the Magar community with an unusual opportunity that they
capitalized on by using their social and political networks. The Magar community and,
more specifically, Satish Magar recognized the potential in developing the land
themselves. They began by building on the mutual cooperation and trust from years of
farming in an agricultural cooperative. They also used their kinship ties and social
networks to control relations within the coalition — Satish ‘dada’,14 as he is fondly
called, had been a prominent member of the community and emerged as the natural
leader. He was able to create a coalition within the farmers that converted their social
capital into a business relationship.
However, merely developing a successful internal coalition would have been pointless
without the second external coalition that the development company formed with city
and state-level actors like politicians, government bureaucrats and bankers. Had the
farming community not forged these connections, this would have been yet another story
of farmer displacement. Once again, these were networks that Satish Magar and his
family had cultivated over three generations. He was able to draw on these networks to
identify specific individuals who came to be part of the company’s board of directors and
act as independent consultants to the project. It is important to recognize here that most
of the dealings (all of which were legal and above board) took place outside ‘formal’
governmental or business channels. This is due to the nature of the relationships and
networks (informal, social, personal) that made the coalitions possible in the first place.
Successful coalition building therefore depends on three factors: access to political
and financial resources, strong cohesive leadership and the ability to recognize and
capitalize on opportunity. In the case of Magarpatta City, Satish Magar proved to be a
capable leader by uniting the larger community in a common goal. He also provided the
necessary political resources as well as the initial financial capital. The farmer families
complemented this by providing their labor, in addition, of course, to the initial
investment of land.
Neha Sami (nehasami@umich.edu), Department of Urban and Regional Planning,
University of Michigan, 2000 Bonisteel Blvd, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA.
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Résumé
Dans une Inde toujours plus mondialisée, une communauté agricole de Pune
(Maharashtra) confrontée à la perte de terres cultivées au profit de l’urbanisation a mis
au point une solution originale. Réunissant leurs terres, les agriculteurs ont mobilisé
leurs réseaux sociaux et politiques pour tirer parti du nouveau climat économique de
Pune, créant une commune plurifonctionnelle sur les 160 hectares de leurs terres
arables. Ils ont formé des alliances avec d’autres parties prenantes, à la fois au sein de
la communauté agricole et aux niveaux de la ville et de l’État. Cette étude de cas
souligne l’importance des coalitions ponctuelles dans les structures de pouvoir et les
politiques des processus urbains en Inde. Dans les villes indiennes, ces coalitions sont
nées d’une vacance du pouvoir politique et des responsables face à l’évolution des
centres d’intérêt et des priorités des gouvernements national et régionaux, ainsi que des
insuffisances croissantes dans la fourniture des services urbains.
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